47 Pages Posted: 10 Aug 2004
Date Written: July 2004
This Paper examines pitfalls of a state-dominated financial system in the context of China. These include possible segmentation of the internal capital market due to local government interference and misallocation of capital. First, we employ two standard tools from the international finance literature to analyze financial integration across Chinese provinces. Both tests confirm a similar (and somewhat surprising) picture: Capital mobility within China is low! Furthermore, the degree of internal financial integration appears to have decreased, rather than increased, in the 1990s relative to the preceding period. Second, we document that the government tends to reallocate capital from more productive regions towards less productive ones. In this sense, a smaller role of the government in the financial sector might increase economic efficiency and the rate of economic growth.
Keywords: Chinese economy, internal capital market, financial integration, Feldstein-Horioka, risk sharing
JEL Classification: F30, G10
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Boyreau-Debray, Genevieve and Wei, Shang-Jin, Pitfalls of a State-Dominated Financial System: The Case of China (July 2004). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4471. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=574541
By Kui-wai Li
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File name: SSRN-id574541.
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