Who is the Enemy?

22 Pages Posted: 11 Aug 2004

See all articles by Gil S. Epstein

Gil S. Epstein

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; University College London - CReAM - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration

Ira N. Gang

Rutgers University - Economics Department; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 2004

Abstract

We examine who benefits when there is a strong leader in place, and those who benefit when a situation lacks a proper leader. There are fractious terrorist groups who seek to serve the same people in common cause against a common enemy. The groups compete for rents obtained from the public by engaging in actions against the common enemy. We derive a condition under which the concerned parties, the terrorist groups and the local population upon whom the terrorist groups inflict their actions, benefit or lose in the two scenarios, and examine the consequences of counter-terrorist policy.

Keywords: terrorism, rent-seeking, all-pay auction, lottery

JEL Classification: D71, D72, D74

Suggested Citation

Epstein, Gil S. and Gang, Ira N., Who is the Enemy? (August 2004). IZA Discussion Paper No. 1237. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=575002

Gil S. Epstein

Bar-Ilan University - Department of Economics ( email )

Ramat-Gan, 52900
Israel
+972 3 531 8937 (Phone)
+972 3 535 3180 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.biu.ac.il/~epsteig/

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

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University College London - CReAM - Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration ( email )

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Ira N. Gang (Contact Author)

Rutgers University - Economics Department ( email )

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New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1248
United States
732-932-7363 (Phone)
732-932-7416 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://econweb.rutgers.edu/gang/research

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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