First and Second Prizes in Imperfectly Discriminating Contests

25 Pages Posted: 12 Aug 2004

See all articles by Stefan Szymanski

Stefan Szymanski

Imperial College London - Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine

Tommaso M. Valletti

Imperial College Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: July 2004

Abstract

Most of the contest literature deals with first prizes; this Paper deals with the optimality of second prizes. We show that in a three-person contest where one contestant is very strong, a second prize can be optimal from the point of view of eliciting maximum effort from every contestant. Moreover, we consider the desirability of second prizes from the point of view of competitive balance, which matters for contests such as sports competitions.

Keywords: Imperfectly discriminating (logit) contests, prizes

JEL Classification: D43, L13

Suggested Citation

Szymanski, Stefan and Valletti, Tommaso M., First and Second Prizes in Imperfectly Discriminating Contests (July 2004). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4484. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=575541

Stefan Szymanski

Imperial College London - Imperial College of Science, Technology and Medicine ( email )

Exhibition Road
London, SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom
+44 20 7594 9107 (Phone)
+44 20 7823 7685 (Fax)

Tommaso M. Valletti (Contact Author)

Imperial College Business School ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London SW7 2AZ, SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
21
Abstract Views
934
PlumX Metrics