Gatekeeping

Stanford GSB Working Paper No. 1861(R)

42 Pages Posted: 19 Aug 2004

See all articles by Christophe Crombez

Christophe Crombez

Stanford University - Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies; KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB)

Tim Groseclose

George Mason University - Department of Economics

Keith Krehbiel

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Date Written: February 2005

Abstract

Collective choice bodies throughout the world use a diverse array of codified rules that determine who may exercise procedural rights, and in what order. This paper analyzes several two-stage decision-making models, focusing on one in which the first-moving actor has a unique, unilateral, procedural right to enforce the status quo, i.e., to exercise gatekeeping. Normative analysis using Pareto-dominance criteria reveals that the institution of gatekeeping is inferior to another institutional arrangement within this framework-namely, one in which the same actor is given a traditional veto instead of a gatekeeping right. The analytical results raise an empirical puzzle: When and why would self-organizing collective choice bodies adopt gatekeeping institutions? A qualitative survey of governmental institutions suggests that - contrary to an entrenched modeling norm within political science - empirical instances of codified gatekeeping rights are rare or nonexistent.

Keywords: government and business, legislation/regulation, politics, collective choice theory

Suggested Citation

Crombez, Christophe and Groseclose, Tim and Krehbiel, Keith, Gatekeeping (February 2005). Stanford GSB Working Paper No. 1861(R). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=577842 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.577842

Christophe Crombez

Stanford University - Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

KU Leuven - Faculty of Business and Economics (FEB) ( email )

Naamsestraat 69
Leuven, B-3000
Belgium

Tim Groseclose

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

Keith Krehbiel (Contact Author)

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

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