Symmetrical Research Joint Ventures: Cooperative Substitutes and Complements
28 Pages Posted: 6 Sep 2004
Date Written: July 2004
Abstract
We introduce the concept of cooperative substitutes and complements, and use it to throw light on the conditions for a research joint venture to choose equal levels of R&D by all member firms. We show that the second-order conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form, ruling out both excessive cooperative substitutability and excessive cooperative complementarity, and nesting conditions already derived in the literature. Finally, we explore the implications of our results for the comparison between research joint ventures and a non-cooperative equilibrium.
Keywords: Bertrand and Cournot competition, cooperative substitutes and complements, R&D, research joint ventures, strategic trade and industrial policy
JEL Classification: D43, L13, L40
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
The Sensitivity of Strategic and Corrective R&D Policy in Oligopolistic Industries
By Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger
-
Robust Rules for Industrial Policy in Open Economies
By Dermot Leahy and J. Peter Neary
-
Free Trade vs. Strategic Trade: A Peek into Pandora's Box
By Gene M. Grossman and Giovanni Maggi
-
R&D Policies, Trade and Process Innovation
By Jan I. Haaland and Hans Jarle Kind
-
By Dermot Leahy and J. Peter Neary
-
Cooperative and Non-Cooperative R&D Policy in an Economic Union
By Jan I. Haaland and Hans Jarle Kind
-
Product Differentiation and Endogenous Mode of Competition
By Michele Polo and Massimo Motta
-
By Delia Ionascu and Krešimir Žigić
-
Strategic Trade Policy with Endogenous Product Differentiation
-
Subsidizing Away Exports? A Note on R&D-Policy Towards Multinational Firms