Management's Incentives, Equity's Bargaining Power and Deviations from Absolute Priority in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, Vol 68 No 2, April 1995

Posted: 23 Jan 1995

Abstract

I examine the determinants of equity's absolute priority deviation in 75 bankruptcies. Previous research emphasizes the value of the shareholders' option to delay a reorganization. In practice, managers control this option, and agency problems between managers and shareholders can be severe in bankruptcy. Equity's bargaining power should depend on managers' incentives and creditor control over managers. Empirical evidence indicates that priority deviations are larger when the firm is closer to solvency, banks hold fewer claims, the CEO holds more shares, CEO pay and shareholder wealth are positively related, and the firm retains the exclusive right to propose a bankruptcy plan.

JEL Classification: G32

Suggested Citation

Betker, Brian L., Management's Incentives, Equity's Bargaining Power and Deviations from Absolute Priority in Chapter 11 Bankruptcies. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, Vol 68 No 2, April 1995, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5783

Brian L. Betker (Contact Author)

Saint Louis University ( email )

St. Louis, MO 63108-3397
United States

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