A Model of Hierarchical Judicial Auditing

97-25

Posted: 8 Feb 1998

See all articles by Eric L. Talley

Eric L. Talley

Columbia University - School of Law; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Abstract

This note develops a general game-theoretic framework for a model of auditing within a two-tiered judicial hierarchy. Using this framework, I characterize the equilibrium allocation of "real" versus "formal" authority between a lower court and a higher court, when the latter faces costs in reviewing lower court opinions. In particular, I study the equilibrium comparative statics relationship between (1) the costs of reviewing, (2) differences in "ideology" between the lower and higher court, and (3) the magnitude of measurement error within the lower court.

Suggested Citation

Talley, Eric L., A Model of Hierarchical Judicial Auditing. 97-25, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=57961

Eric L. Talley (Contact Author)

Columbia University - School of Law ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10025
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.erictalley.com

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
629
PlumX Metrics