The Effects of Living Wage Laws: Evidence from Failed and Derailed Living Wage Campaigns

37 Pages Posted: 23 Aug 2004

See all articles by Scott J. Adams

Scott J. Adams

University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee - Department of Economics

David Neumark

University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2005

Abstract

Living wage campaigns have succeeded in about 100 jurisdictions in the United States but have also been unsuccessful in numerous cities. These unsuccessful campaigns provide a better control group or counterfactual for estimating the effects of living wage laws than the broader set of all cities without a law, and also permit the separate estimation of the effects of living wage laws and living wage campaigns. We find that living wage laws raise wages of low-wage workers but reduce employment among the least-skilled, especially when the laws cover business assistance recipients or are accompanied by similar laws in nearby cities.

Keywords: Living wages, wages, employment

JEL Classification: J28, J38

Suggested Citation

Adams, Scott J. and Neumark, David, The Effects of Living Wage Laws: Evidence from Failed and Derailed Living Wage Campaigns (April 2005). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=579906 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.579906

Scott J. Adams (Contact Author)

University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee - Department of Economics ( email )

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David Neumark

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