Posted: 2 Sep 2004
Re-licensing requirements for professionals that move across borders are widespread. In this paper, we measure the effects of occupational licensing by exploiting an immigrant physician re-training assignment rule. Instrumental variables and quantile treatment effects estimates indicate large returns to acquiring an occupational license and negative selection into licensing status. We also develop a model of optimal license acquisition which, together with the empirical results, suggests that stricter re-licensing requirements may not only lead to practitioner rents, but also to lower average quality of service in the market for physicians.
Keywords: licensing, immigrants, physicians
JEL Classification: I11, J62, J44, J61
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Kugler, Adriana D. and Sauer, Robert M., Doctors Without Borders? Re-licensing Requirements and Negative Selection in the Market for Physicians. Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 437-466, July 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=582342