Interdependent Security: A General Model

26 Pages Posted: 13 Sep 2004 Last revised: 3 Oct 2020

See all articles by Geoffrey M. Heal

Geoffrey M. Heal

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Howard Kunreuther

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Pennsylvania - Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center

Date Written: August 2004

Abstract

In an interdependent world the risks faced by any one agent depend not only on its choices but also on those of all others. Expectations about others' choices will influence investments in risk-management, and the outcome can be sub-optimal investment all round. We model this as the Nash equilibrium of a game and give conditions for such a sub-optimal equilibrium to be tipped to an optimal one. We also characterize the smallest coalition to tip an equilibrium, the minimum critical coalition, and show that this is also the cheapest critical coalition, so that there is no less expensive way to move the system from the sub- optimal to the optimal equilibrium. We illustrate these results by reference to airline security, the control of infectious diseases via vaccination and investment in research and development.

Suggested Citation

Heal, Geoffrey M. and Kunreuther, Howard C. and Kunreuther, Howard C., Interdependent Security: A General Model (August 2004). NBER Working Paper No. w10706, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=583704

Geoffrey M. Heal (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Columbia Business School, Finance ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/gheal/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Howard C. Kunreuther

University of Pennsylvania - Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center ( email )

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United States
215-898-4589 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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