Network Interconnection with Competitive Transit

NET Institute Working Paper No. 03-5

25 Pages Posted: 6 Sep 2004

See all articles by David Gilo

David Gilo

Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law

Yossi Spiegel

Tel Aviv University, Coller School of Management; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Date Written: December 2003

Abstract

We examine the interaction between two interconnected networks (e.g., two LECs) and a third network (e.g., an IXC) seeking access to their customer base. The IXC could either interconnect with both LECs or interconnect with only one LEC and transit calls to the other LEC via the first LEC's network. We show that there is a wide set of cases in which competitive transit could justify partial or even complete deregulation of access to a network's customer base.

Keywords: Interconnection, access pricing, transit, telecommunication

JEL Classification: L51, L96

Suggested Citation

Gilo, David and Spiegel, Yossi, Network Interconnection with Competitive Transit (December 2003). NET Institute Working Paper No. 03-5. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=584861 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.584861

David Gilo (Contact Author)

Tel Aviv University - Buchmann Faculty of Law ( email )

Ramat Aviv
Tel Aviv 69978, IL
Israel
+972-3-6406299 (Phone)

Yossi Spiegel

Tel Aviv University, Coller School of Management ( email )

Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
972-3-640-9063 (Phone)
972-3-640-7739 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.tau.ac.il/~spiegel

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

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