Public Service Provision, User Fees, and Political Turmoil

Cornell Food and Nutrition Policy Program Working Paper No. 155

23 Pages Posted: 10 Sep 2004

See all articles by Marcel Fafchamps

Marcel Fafchamps

Stanford University - Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

Bart Minten

Cornell University - Food and Nutrition Policy Program; Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Department of Agro-Engineering and Economics

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Date Written: January 2004

Abstract

Following an electoral dispute, the central highlands of the island of Madagascar were subjected to an economic blockade during the first half of 2002. After the blockade ended in June 2002, user fees for health services and school fees were progressively eliminated. This paper examines the provision of schooling and health services to rural areas of Madagascar before, during, and after the blockade. We find that public services were more resilient to the blockade than initially anticipated, but that health services were more affected than schools. The removal of user fees had a large significant effect on public services that is distinct from the end of the blockade and the increase in school book provision.

Suggested Citation

Fafchamps, Marcel and Minten, Bart, Public Service Provision, User Fees, and Political Turmoil (January 2004). Cornell Food and Nutrition Policy Program Working Paper No. 155, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=587401 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.587401

Marcel Fafchamps (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305
United States

Bart Minten

Cornell University - Food and Nutrition Policy Program ( email )

BP 6313
Antananarivo 101
Madagascar
033 11 38520 (Phone)
261 20 2222198 (Fax)

Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) - Department of Agro-Engineering and Economics ( email )

Kardinaal Mercierlaan 92
Heverlee, B-3001
Belgium

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