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Soft Negligence and Cause in Fact: A Comment on Ganuza and Gomez

11 Pages Posted: 13 Sep 2004  

Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

Amsterdam Law School; Amsterdam Business School; Tinbergen Institute

Date Written: September 2004

Abstract

Lowering the standard of negligence below the first-best socially optimal level has been shown by Ganuza and Gomez (2004) to increase the level of care taken by judgment proof injurers. In this paper, I consider a more complex model of negligence in which cause in fact is taken into account, and I show that this conclusion holds when the injurer's care reduces the magnitude of the accidental harm but not when the injurer's care reduces the probability of the accident. Thus, such soft negligence strategies aimed at tackling the adverse effects of judgment proofness need to be conditioned to the accident prevention technology available to injurers.

Keywords: insolvency, judgment proof, liability, insolvency, cause in fact, soft negligence

JEL Classification: K13, K32

Suggested Citation

Dari‐Mattiacci, Giuseppe, Soft Negligence and Cause in Fact: A Comment on Ganuza and Gomez (September 2004). George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-37. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=589324 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.589324

Amsterdam Business School ( email )

Roetersstraat 18
Amsterdam, 1018WB
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

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