Soft Negligence and Cause in Fact: A Comment on Ganuza and Gomez

11 Pages Posted: 13 Sep 2004

See all articles by Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: September 2004

Abstract

Lowering the standard of negligence below the first-best socially optimal level has been shown by Ganuza and Gomez (2004) to increase the level of care taken by judgment proof injurers. In this paper, I consider a more complex model of negligence in which cause in fact is taken into account, and I show that this conclusion holds when the injurer's care reduces the magnitude of the accidental harm but not when the injurer's care reduces the probability of the accident. Thus, such soft negligence strategies aimed at tackling the adverse effects of judgment proofness need to be conditioned to the accident prevention technology available to injurers.

Keywords: insolvency, judgment proof, liability, insolvency, cause in fact, soft negligence

JEL Classification: K13, K32

Suggested Citation

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe, Soft Negligence and Cause in Fact: A Comment on Ganuza and Gomez (September 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=589324 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.589324

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (Contact Author)

University of Amsterdam ( email )

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Amsterdam, Noord-Holland 1001 ND
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Tinbergen Institute ( email )

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European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

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