How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops

Posted: 28 Feb 1995

See all articles by Nicholas Barberis

Nicholas Barberis

Yale School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Maxim Boycko

Russian Privatization Center

Andrei Shleifer

Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Natalia Tsukanova

The Boston Consulting Group

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: November 1994

Abstract

A number of recent studies have testified to the benefits of private as opposed to state ownership of firms. One research strand compares private and state firms in the same line of activity, such as air transport or railroads, and finds the former to be more efficient (see Boardman and Vining, 1989, for a survey). A second strand reveals the improvements in a given company's operations following privatization (see Megginson et al., 1994). A third strand documents the lower cost of contracting public services to private suppliers than providing it publicly (see Donahue, 1989). This research makes a convincing case for the greater efficiency of private ownership.

JEL Classification: G30

Suggested Citation

Barberis, Nicholas and Boycko, Maxim and Shleifer, Andrei and Tsukanova, Natalia, How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops (November 1994). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5910

Nicholas Barberis

Yale School of Management ( email )

135 Prospect Street
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States
203-436-0777 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
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Maxim Boycko

Russian Privatization Center

Andrei Shleifer (Contact Author)

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-5046 (Phone)
617-496-1708 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/~ashleife/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

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B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Natalia Tsukanova

The Boston Consulting Group

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3741 EH Baarn
Netherlands

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