Director Ownership and Voluntary Segment Disclosure: Hong Kong Evidence

26 Pages Posted: 21 Sep 2004

See all articles by Sidney Leung

Sidney Leung

City University of Hong Kong (CityUHK) - Department of Accountancy

Bertrand Horwitz

SUNY at Binghamton - School of Management

Abstract

Weakness of corporate governance and lack of transparency are often considered causes of or contributors to the Asian Financial Crisis. Publicly listed companies in Hong Kong, like other Asian firms, have concentrated director ownership. The study uses voluntary segment disclosure above the benchmark minimum as a proxy for transparency and examines its relationship to the ownership structure and composition of corporate boards in Hong Kong. We find that: (1) high (concentrated) board ownership explains the extent of low voluntary segment disclosure and this negative relationship is stronger when firm performance is very poor; (2) the contribution of non-executive directors to enhance voluntary segment disclosure is effective for firms with low director ownership but not for concentrated-ownership firms. These results have implications for policy makers and regulators in the Asia-Pacific region striving to improve governance and transparency.

JEL Classification: M41, M45, G32, G34, G38, M47

Suggested Citation

Leung, Sidney and Horwitz, Bertrand, Director Ownership and Voluntary Segment Disclosure: Hong Kong Evidence. Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 235-260, October 2004. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=591401

Sidney Leung (Contact Author)

City University of Hong Kong (CityUHK) - Department of Accountancy ( email )

83 Tat Chee Avenue
Kowloon
Hong Kong
China
+852 2788-7924 (Phone)
+852 2788-7944 (Fax)

Bertrand Horwitz

SUNY at Binghamton - School of Management ( email )

P.O. Box 6015
Binghamton, NY 13902-6015
United States

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