16 Pages Posted: 20 Sep 2004 Last revised: 11 Jan 2014
Date Written: February 22, 2004
This Article conducts an experimental investigation of anticommons dilemmas. The results confirm that anticommons deadweight losses increase with the degree of complementarity and the degree of fragmentation of property. Our study further provides three novel insights into the problem of fragmentation. First, the data illustrates that individual right holders ignore the expected value of bundling and instead focus on the maximum profit he or she could realize by bundling. Second, the experiments suggest that uncertainty amplifies the anticommons pricing effect. Finally, cooperation is higher in cases wherethe value of bundling is more uncertain as opposed to scenarios where there is relative certainty of creating surplus but there is a (modest) chance of losses from bundling.
Keywords: Anticommons, property regimes, law and economics
JEL Classification: K10, K11
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Depoorter, Ben and Vanneste, Sven, Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together: Experimental Evidence of Anticommons Tragedies (February 22, 2004). 3 Journal of Law, Economics & Policy 1 (2006).. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=592166 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.592166