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The Transparency of Central Bank Preferences

19 Pages Posted: 18 Sep 2004  

Volker Hahn

University of Konstanz

Date Written: January 2006

Abstract

We examine whether the transparency of the weight central banks attach to employment goals compared to inflation targets is beneficial. We show that society prefers transparency if it sufficiently values the employment target, whereas it prefers opacity if it estimates inflation as sufficiently important.

Keywords: Central Bank Objectives, Transparency

JEL Classification: E58

Suggested Citation

Hahn, Volker, The Transparency of Central Bank Preferences (January 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=592261 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.592261

Volker Hahn (Contact Author)

University of Konstanz ( email )

Box 143
Konstanz, 78457
Germany

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