Arbitration: Governance Benefits and Enforcement Costs

12 Pages Posted: 22 Sep 2004

See all articles by Keith N. Hylton

Keith N. Hylton

Boston University - School of Law

Date Written: September 22, 2004

Abstract

These remarks, presented at the 2004 AALS Annual Meeting panel on civil procedure, review the economic theory of arbitration and related empirical evidence. For parties who can choose between alternative legal regimes, the key determinants of that choice are the governance benefits and enforcement costs connected to the rules under each regime. The choice between arbitration and litigation should be made on the same basis. The empirical literature, though sparse, suggests that superior governance benefits provide a significant reason for arbitration agreements.

Keywords: arbitration, governance, enforcement, norms, choice between arbitration and litigation

JEL Classification: K00, K13, K14, K42

Suggested Citation

Hylton, Keith N., Arbitration: Governance Benefits and Enforcement Costs (September 22, 2004). Boston Univ. School of Law Working Paper No. 04-09. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=594301 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.594301

Keith N. Hylton (Contact Author)

Boston University - School of Law ( email )

765 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-8959 (Phone)
617-353-3077 (Fax)

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
344
Abstract Views
2,623
rank
87,467
PlumX Metrics