Feints

26 Pages Posted: 24 Sep 2004

See all articles by Kenneth Hendricks

Kenneth Hendricks

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics

R. Preston McAfee

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences; Yahoo! - Yahoo! Research Labs

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 15, 2004

Abstract

In both military and economic situations, agents may try to mislead adversaries about true types or plans, whatever they may be. We consider a simple model in which one player attacks and the other player defends. We show that such environments have two types of possible equilibrium behavior, depending upon the signaling technology. If the signal is not very revealing about the attacker's plans, then the attacker always invests some resources in misdirection but attacks with his main force. If the technology is revealing, then the attacker feints some times and attacks with his full force other times. When he feints, he invests more than half of his resources into misdirection. Comparative statics also depend on whether the technology is revealing.

Keywords: Feint, misdirection, sender-receiver games, games, beliefs, conflict, war, Normandy, Calais

Suggested Citation

Hendricks, Kenneth and McAfee, Randolph Preston and McAfee, Randolph Preston, Feints (September 15, 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=594606 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.594606

Kenneth Hendricks

University of Texas at Austin - Department of Economics ( email )

Austin, TX 78712
United States
512-475-8532 (Phone)
512-471-3510 (Fax)

Randolph Preston McAfee (Contact Author)

Yahoo! - Yahoo! Research Labs ( email )

Sunnyvale, CA 94089
United States

California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )

1200 East California Blvd.
Pasadena, CA 91125
United States

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