Continuing Wars of Attrition
36 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 2004
Date Written: June 7, 2000
Abstract
This paper presents a new model of the war of attrition, based on a geographical or territorial dispute. Both sides try to extend their boundaries, and the level of effort at each time is endogenous. There are two kinds of stationary equilibria, one with fighting to completion, the other with a cessation of hostilities. As a player gets closer to losing, that player's probability of winning battles falls, social welfare rises, and the levels of effort of both players rise. A draw or standoff is possible. The theory is applied to a variety of conflicts, including wars and attempts at market domination.
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