Sectoral Regulators and the Competition Authority: Which Relationship is Best?

34 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 2004

See all articles by Pedro P. Barros

Pedro P. Barros

Universidade Nova de Lisboa

Steffen Hoernig

Nova School of Business and Economics

Date Written: August 2004

Abstract

Inspired by the creation of the new Competition Authority in Portugal, we consider the interplay between regulatory agencies with overlapping competencies; for example, a competition authority and a sectoral regulator. We analyze how authorities' incentives are affected if they can decide independently, or must follow each others' opinions, respectively, and consider how this relationship performs in the presence of institutional biases and lobbying efforts. It is found that the best results tend to be achieved when the authorities act independently of each other: the probability of coming to a decision is higher, and decisions are less vulnerable to lobbying.

Keywords: Competition authority, sectoral regulators, institutional relationship, strategic substitutes and complements, lobbying

JEL Classification: L51

Suggested Citation

Pita Barros, Pedro Luis and Hoernig, Steffen, Sectoral Regulators and the Competition Authority: Which Relationship is Best? (August 2004). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 4541. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=594849

Pedro Luis Pita Barros (Contact Author)

Universidade Nova de Lisboa ( email )

Campus de Campolide
Lisboa, 1099-032
Portugal
+351 21 383 3624 (Phone)
+351 21 388 6073 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://ppbarros.fe.unl.pt

Steffen Hoernig

Nova School of Business and Economics ( email )

Universidade Nova de Lisboa
Campus de Campolide
Lisboa, 1099-032
Portugal
+351-213801600 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://docentes.fe.unl.pt/~shoernig/

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
22
Abstract Views
1,215
PlumX Metrics