Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries

Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2004-013/3

9 Pages Posted: 26 Sep 2004

See all articles by Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - Department of Economics

Peter Nijkamp

VU University of Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 2004

Abstract

Goods are often allocated publically by means of queuing processes in developing countries. In such situations, which group of citizens should a corrupt government official favor? In addition, what should be the basis for this favoritism? To the best of our knowledge, these salient questions have received scant attention in the literature. Consequently, we use queuing theory to first demonstrate that when allocating goods publically, a case can be made for favoring a particular group of citizens. Next, we show that the nature of this favoritism depends not only on the bribes received by the corrupt government official but also on the efficiency with which this official discharges his duties.

Keywords: Bribery, Corruption, Favoritism, Public Provision

JEL Classification: O12, D81

Suggested Citation

Batabyal, Amitrajeet A. and Nijkamp, Peter, Favoritism in the Public Provision of Goods in Developing Countries (September 2004). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2004-013/3, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=594941 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.594941

Amitrajeet A. Batabyal (Contact Author)

Rochester Institute of Technology (RIT) - Department of Economics ( email )

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Rochester, NY 14623-5604
United States
585-475-2805 (Phone)
585-475-5777 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://people.rit.edu/aabgsh

Peter Nijkamp

VU University of Amsterdam - Department of Spatial Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081HV Amsterdam
Netherlands
+31 20 4446091 (Phone)
+31 20 4445611 (Fax)

Tinbergen Institute

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Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

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