School Performance in Australia: Is There a Role for Quasi-Markets?

16 Pages Posted: 6 Oct 2004

See all articles by Steve Bradley

Steve Bradley

Lancaster University

Mirko Draca

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP); Harvard University - Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics; University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Colin P. Green

Department of Economics

Abstract

Recent changes to the organisation of Australia's education system have raised the possibility of implementing wide-ranging market reforms. In this article we discuss the scope for introducing reforms similar to the United Kingdom's 'quasi-market' model. We discuss the role of school league tables in providing signals and incentives in a quasi-market. Specifically, we compare a range of unadjusted and model-based league tables of primary school performance in Queensland's public education system. These comparisons indicate that model-based tables which account for socio-economic status and student intake quality vary significantly from the unadjusted tables.

Suggested Citation

Bradley, Steve and Draca, Mirko and Green, Colin P., School Performance in Australia: Is There a Role for Quasi-Markets?. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=595033

Steve Bradley (Contact Author)

Lancaster University ( email )

The Management School
Department of Economics
Lancaster LA1 4YX
United Kingdom
+44 1524 593880 (Phone)
+44 1524 594244 (Fax)

Mirko Draca

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
+20 7955 7010 (Phone)

Harvard University - Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics ( email )

124 Mount Auburn Street
Suite 520N
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

University of Warwick - Department of Economics ( email )

Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom

Colin P. Green

Department of Economics ( email )

Høgskoleringen
Trondheim NO-7491, 7491
Norway

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