Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby's and Christie's

25 Pages Posted: 7 Oct 2004 Last revised: 2 Jul 2010

See all articles by Orley Ashenfelter

Orley Ashenfelter

Princeton University - Industrial Relations Section; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Kathryn Graddy

Brandeis University - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 2004

Abstract

The Sotheby's/Christie's price-fixing scandal that ended in the public trial of Alfred Taubman provides a unique window on a number of key economic and antitrust policy issues related to the use of the auction system. The trial provided detailed evidence as to how the price fixing worked, and the economic conditions under which it was started and began to fall apart. The outcome of the case also provides evidence on the novel auction process used to choose the lead counsel for the civil settlement. Finally, though buyers received the bulk of the damages, a straightforward application of the economic theory of auctions shows that it is unlikely that successful buyers as a group were injured.

Suggested Citation

Ashenfelter, Orley C. and Graddy, Kathryn, Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby's and Christie's (September 2004). NBER Working Paper No. w10795. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=595194

Orley C. Ashenfelter (Contact Author)

Princeton University - Industrial Relations Section ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544-2098
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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Kathryn Graddy

Brandeis University - Department of Economics ( email )

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United States
781-736-8616 (Phone)
781-736-2269 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://people.brandeis.edu/~kgraddy/

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