Fending Off One Means Fending Off All: Evolutionary Stability in Submodular Games

21 Pages Posted: 6 Oct 2004

See all articles by Wolfgang Leininger

Wolfgang Leininger

University of Dortmund - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Date Written: August 2004

Abstract

The implications of evolutionarily stable behavior in finite populations have recently been explored for a variety of aggregative games. This note proves an intimate relationship between submodularity and global evolutionary stability of strategies for these games, which - apart from being of independent interest - accounts for a number of results obtained in the recent literature: we show that any evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of a submodular aggregative game must also be globally stable. i.e. if one mutant cannot successfully invade a population, any number of mutants can even less do so.

JEL Classification: C79, D72

Suggested Citation

Leininger, Wolfgang, Fending Off One Means Fending Off All: Evolutionary Stability in Submodular Games (August 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=601285

Wolfgang Leininger (Contact Author)

University of Dortmund - Department of Economics ( email )

D-44221 Dortmund
Germany
+49 231 755 3297 (Phone)
+49 231 755 3027 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

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