Job Scheduling, Cooperation, and Control

CentER Discussion Paper No. 2004-65

10 Pages Posted: 14 Oct 2004

See all articles by Pedro Calleja

Pedro Calleja

University of Barcelona - Department of Actuarial, Financial and Economic Mathematics

Arantza Estevez-Fernandez

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Econometrics and Operations Research; Tinbergen Institute

Peter Borm

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Herbert Hamers

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Date Written: July 2004

Abstract

This paper considers one machine job scheduling situations or sequencing problems, where clients can have more than a single job to be processed in order to get a final output. Moreover, a job can be of interest for different players. This means that one of the main assumptions in classic sequencing problems is dropped: the one to one correspondence between clients and jobs. It is shown that the corresponding cooperative games are balanced for specific types of cost criteria.

Keywords: Scheduling, cooperation, game theory, cooperative games

JEL Classification: C71

Suggested Citation

Calleja, Pedro and Estevez-Fernandez, Arantza and Borm, Peter E. M. and Hamers, Herbert, Job Scheduling, Cooperation, and Control (July 2004). CentER Discussion Paper No. 2004-65. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=603305 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.603305

Pedro Calleja

University of Barcelona - Department of Actuarial, Financial and Economic Mathematics ( email )

Avda. Diagonal 690
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

Arantza Estevez-Fernandez (Contact Author)

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Econometrics and Operations Research ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

Peter E. M. Borm

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Herbert Hamers

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 4666 2660 (Phone)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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