The Public Choice Revolution

8 Pages Posted: 22 Oct 2004

See all articles by Pierre Lemieux

Pierre Lemieux

University of Quebec in Outaouais

Abstract

Public Choice analysis begins with a simple question: How are collective decisions made? The answer, of course, is that the decisions are made by policymakers - politicians and bureaucrats - and by voters. The starting idea of public choice theory is disarmingly simple: Individuals, when acting as voters, politicians, or bureaucrats, continue to be self-interested and try to maximize their utility. In a narrow sense, public choice analysis is concerned with "state failures."

Keywords: Public choice, pareto-optimal, median-voter theorem, voting, elections, democracy, decision-making

JEL Classification: D72, H3

Suggested Citation

Lemieux, Pierre, The Public Choice Revolution. Regulation, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 22-29, Fall 2004. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=604046

Pierre Lemieux (Contact Author)

University of Quebec in Outaouais ( email )

Case postale 1250
succursale Hull
Gatineau, Qu├ębec J8X 3X7
Canada

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