Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help

28 Pages Posted: 14 Oct 2004

See all articles by Joseph Farrell

Joseph Farrell

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics

Robert P. Merges

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law

Abstract

Given the limits on Patent Office scrutiny of patent applications, one might hope that ex post litigation can fix at least the important errors. Unfortunately, the often grossly skewed incentives to challenge and to defend issued patents make this view too optimistic. Since litigation cannot fix all errors, we urge better USPTO funding and higher standards of initial review, better incentives (not limited to formal duties) for applicants to find and disclose prior art information, and the creation of a cheap and workable administrative post-issue review. We explain why existing administrative reviews are not a workable system, and recommend some features that a new system should have.

Keywords: patents, uspto, law

Suggested Citation

Farrell, Joseph and Merges, Robert P., Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=604702

Joseph Farrell (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )

549 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
United States
510-642-9854 (Phone)
510-642-6615 (Fax)

Robert P. Merges

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )

215 Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
510-643-6199 (Phone)
510-643-6171 (Fax)

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