Coordinating Tariff Reduction and Domestic Tax Reform Under Imperfect Competition

CentER Discussion Paper No. 2004-78

11 Pages Posted: 15 Oct 2004

See all articles by Michael Keen

Michael Keen

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Fiscal Affairs Department; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)

Jenny E. Ligthart

Tilburg University - CentER, Department of Economics; University of Groningen - Faculty of Economics and Business; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: May 2004

Abstract

A major constraint on trade liberalization in many countries is the prospective loss of government revenue. Recent results, however, have established a simple and appealing strategy for overcoming this difficulty, whilst still realizing the efficiency gains from liberalization, in small, competitive economies: combining tariff cuts with point-for-point increases in destination-based consumption taxes unambiguously increases both national welfare and total government revenue. This note explores the implications of imperfect competition for this strategy. Examples are easily found in which this strategy unambiguously reduces domestic welfare.

Keywords: Tariff reform, Tax reform, Imperfect competition, trade liberalization

JEL Classification: F12, F13, H20

Suggested Citation

Keen, Michael and Ligthart, Jenny E., Coordinating Tariff Reduction and Domestic Tax Reform Under Imperfect Competition (May 2004). CentER Discussion Paper No. 2004-78. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=605062 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.605062

Michael Keen (Contact Author)

International Monetary Fund (IMF) - Fiscal Affairs Department ( email )

700 19th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS)

7 Ridgmount Street
London, WC1E 7AE
United Kingdom

Jenny E. Ligthart

Tilburg University - CentER, Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 8755 (Phone)
+31 13 466 4032 (Fax)

University of Groningen - Faculty of Economics and Business ( email )

Postbus 72
9700 AB Groningen
Netherlands

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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