Price-Setting Power and Information Asymmetry in Sealed Bidding

Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 27, 2003

51 Pages Posted: 18 Oct 2004 Last revised: 24 Feb 2008


Diverging from the historical precedent of using a midpoint rule (k=1/2) to experimentally structure two-person bargaining under incomplete information, extreme values of k (k={0,1}) are invoked in an asymmetric information environment endowing one player with exclusive price-setting power and the other player with veto-only power. Theoretical analysis suggests that regardless of who possesses an information advantage, expected profits for a seller (buyer) decrease (increase) in k. Yet, experimental results show that under conditions of dramatic information asymmetry, not only is the observed share of the surplus is much smaller than predicted for the player with price-setting power, but also the player with the information advantage is unable to garner a greater share of the surplus as has been consistently demonstrated in previous studies providing a boundary test of Daniel et. al's Information Disparity Hypothesis (1998).

Keywords: Bilateral bargaining, sealed bid, k-double auction, LES, incomplete information

JEL Classification: C72, C78, D81

Suggested Citation

Parco, Jim, Price-Setting Power and Information Asymmetry in Sealed Bidding. Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 27, 2003. Available at SSRN:

Jim Parco (Contact Author)

Colorado College ( email )

Department of Economics and Business
14 E. Cache la Poudre St.
Colorado Springs, CO 80903
United States
719-389-6416 (Phone)
719-389-6927 (Fax)


Register to save articles to
your library


Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics