Equilibrium Play in Single-Server Queues with Endogenously Determined Arrival Times

25 Pages Posted: 15 Oct 2004 Last revised: 22 Jul 2008

See all articles by Amnon Rapoport

Amnon Rapoport

University of Arizona - Eller College of Management

William E. Stein

Texas A&M University - Mays Business School

James E. Parco

Colorado College

Darryl A. Seale

University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Abstract

We study a class of queueing problems with endogenous arrival times that we formulate as non-cooperative n-person games in normal form with discrete strategy spaces, fixed starting and closing times, and complete information. With multiple equilibria in pure strategies, these queueing games give rise to problems of tacit coordination. We first describe and illustrate a Markov chain algorithm used to compute the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium solution. Then, we report the results of an experimental study of a large-scale (n=20) queueing game with fixed service time, FIFO queue discipline, and no balking, reneging, and early arrivals. Our results show consistent and replicable patterns of arrival that provide strong support for mixed-strategy equilibrium play on the aggregate but not individual level.

Keywords: Queueing, endogenous arrival times, mixed-strategy equilibrium, experimentation

JEL Classification: C72, C92, D81

Suggested Citation

Rapoport, Amnon and Stein, William E. and Parco, Jim and Seale, Darryl A., Equilibrium Play in Single-Server Queues with Endogenously Determined Arrival Times. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 55, pp. 67-91, 2004. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=605207

Amnon Rapoport

University of Arizona - Eller College of Management ( email )

McClelland Hall
P.O. Box 210108
Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
United States
520-621-9325 (Phone)
520-621-4171 (Fax)

William E. Stein

Texas A&M University - Mays Business School ( email )

INFO Dept.
MS4217
College Station, TX 77843-4217
United States
979-845-4339 (Phone)

Jim Parco (Contact Author)

Colorado College ( email )

Department of Economics and Business
14 E. Cache la Poudre St.
Colorado Springs, CO 80903
United States
719-389-6416 (Phone)
719-389-6927 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.coloradocollege.edu/dept/EC/parco.asp

Darryl A. Seale

University of Nevada, Las Vegas ( email )

4505 S. Maryland Parkway
Las Vegas, NV 89154
United States

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