Damages Caps, Insurability, and the Performance of Medical Malpractice Insurance

38 Pages Posted: 19 Oct 2004

See all articles by W. Kip Viscusi

W. Kip Viscusi

Vanderbilt University - Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics; Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management; Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics

Patricia Born

Florida State University - College of Business; Florida State University - College of Business; Florida State University - College of Law; California State University, Northridge - Department of Finance, Real Estate, & Insurance

Date Written: March 2004

Abstract

This paper uses the complete property and casualty insurance files of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners from 1984-1991 to assess the effect of medical malpractice reforms pertaining to damages levels and the degree to which these damages are insurable. Limits on noneconomic damages were most influential in affecting insurance market outcomes. Several punitive damages variables specifically affected the medical malpractice insurance market, including limits on punitive damage levels, prohibitions of the insurability of punitive damages, and prohibition of punitive damages awards. Estimates for insurance losses, premiums, and loss ratios indicate effects of reform in the expected directions, where the greatest constraining effects were for losses. The quantile regression analysis of losses indicates that punitive damages reforms and limits were most consequential for firms at the high end of the loss spectrum. Tort reforms also enhanced insurer profitability during this time period.

Keywords: medical malpractice insurance, tort reform, punitive damages, noneconomic damages

JEL Classification: K13, G22

Suggested Citation

Viscusi, W. Kip and Born, Patricia H. and Born, Patricia H., Damages Caps, Insurability, and the Performance of Medical Malpractice Insurance (March 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=607203 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.607203

W. Kip Viscusi (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University - Law School ( email )

131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States
615-343-7715 (Phone)
615-322-5953 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://law.vanderbilt.edu/bio/?pid=w-kip-viscusi

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
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Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States
(615) 343-7715 (Phone)
(615) 343-5953 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://as.vanderbilt.edu/economics/bio/wkip-viscusi/

Vanderbilt University - Owen Graduate School of Management

401 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203
United States
(615) 343-7715 (Phone)
(615) 343-5953 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://business.vanderbilt.edu/bio/w-kip-viscusi/

Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics

Nashville, TN 37203
United States

Patricia H. Born

Florida State University - College of Business ( email )

423 Rovetta Business Building
Tallahassee, FL 32306-1110
United States

Florida State University - College of Business ( email )

423 Rovetta Business Building
Tallahassee, FL 32306-1110
United States

Florida State University - College of Law

425 W. Jefferson Street
Tallahassee, FL 32306
United States

California State University, Northridge - Department of Finance, Real Estate, & Insurance ( email )

Northridge, CA 91330-8379
United States

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