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National Courts, Global Cartels: F. Hoffman-Laroche Ltd. V. Empagran, S.A. (U.S. Supreme Court 2004)

5 German Law Journal 1096 (2004)

Indiana Legal Studies Research Paper No. 7

13 Pages Posted: 8 Nov 2004 Last revised: 26 Jun 2013

Hannah L. Buxbaum

Indiana University Bloomington Maurer School of Law

Abstract

This comment discusses the Supreme Court's recent decision in Hoffman-LaRoche v. Empagran, an action brought by foreign plaintiffs under U.S. antitrust law to recover damages caused by the activities of a global price-fixing cartel. It describes the jurisdictional issues raised by conduct that affects the global market for a particular good, and analyzes the Court's reliance on notions of comity to restrain the reach of U.S. antitrust law. It argues, however, that the decision does not in fact undermine the anti-comity approach adopted in the 1993 Hartford Fire case, as the Court here assumes that the cartel's effects in the United States were entirely independent of its effects in other countries and therefore unrelated to the plaintiffs' injuries. The comment concludes by noting that the Court left open a number of important questions, including the precise content of a comity analysis and the relationship between private and public enforcement of antitrust law.

Keywords: Antitrust, comity

Suggested Citation

Buxbaum, Hannah L., National Courts, Global Cartels: F. Hoffman-Laroche Ltd. V. Empagran, S.A. (U.S. Supreme Court 2004). 5 German Law Journal 1096 (2004); Indiana Legal Studies Research Paper No. 7. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=609201

Hannah L. Buxbaum (Contact Author)

Indiana University Bloomington Maurer School of Law ( email )

211 S. Indiana Avenue
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

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