Exclusive or Efficient Pricing? The Big Deal Bundling of Academic Journals

39 Pages Posted: 30 Oct 2004

See all articles by Aaron S. Edlin

Aaron S. Edlin

University of California at Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Daniel L. Rubinfeld

University of California at Berkeley - School of Law; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); NYU Law School

Abstract

Prices of academic journals have climbed enormously in the past two decades. This article explains the substantial barriers to entry that established journals enjoy. It points out that the Big Deal bundling that the large commercial publishers have adopted in the past few years creates a substantial additional strategic barrier to entry. We consider whether these bundling offers violate the antitrust laws and conclude that they may.

Keywords: Exclusive dealing, exclusion, bundling, barriers to entry, publishing

Suggested Citation

Edlin, Aaron S. and Rubinfeld, Daniel L., Exclusive or Efficient Pricing? The Big Deal Bundling of Academic Journals. Antitrust Law Journal, Vol. 72, No. 1, 2004. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=610103

Aaron S. Edlin (Contact Author)

University of California at Berkeley ( email )

Dept of Economics 549 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-4719 (Phone)
510-643-0413 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Daniel L. Rubinfeld

University of California at Berkeley - School of Law ( email )

215 Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
(510) 642-1959 (Phone)
(510) 642-3767 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/rubinfeldd

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

NYU Law School ( email )

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New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
(212) 992 8834 (Phone)

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