Exclusive or Efficient Pricing? The Big Deal Bundling of Academic Journals
39 Pages Posted: 30 Oct 2004
Abstract
Prices of academic journals have climbed enormously in the past two decades. This article explains the substantial barriers to entry that established journals enjoy. It points out that the Big Deal bundling that the large commercial publishers have adopted in the past few years creates a substantial additional strategic barrier to entry. We consider whether these bundling offers violate the antitrust laws and conclude that they may.
Keywords: Exclusive dealing, exclusion, bundling, barriers to entry, publishing
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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