Comparing Land Reform and Land Markets in Colombia: Impacts on Equity and Efficiency

29 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by Klaus Deininger

Klaus Deininger

World Bank - Development Economics Group (DEC); World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Raffaella Castagnini

World Bank

María A. González

World Bank

Date Written: March 26, 2004

Abstract

Based on a large survey to compare the effectiveness of land markets and land reform in Colombia, Deininger finds that rental and sales markets were more effective in transferring land to poor but productive producers than was administrative land reform. The fact that land transactions were all of a short-term nature and that little land was transferred from very large to small land owners or the landless suggests that there may be scope for policies both to improve the functioning of land markets and to facilitate greater land access by the most disadvantaged. Analysis of the factors associated with success in a sample of land transfers from large to small producers helps to identify key elements for policies in both respects.

This paper - a product of Rural Development, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to analyze the impact of land policies.

Suggested Citation

Deininger, Klaus and Castagnini, Raffaella and González, María A., Comparing Land Reform and Land Markets in Colombia: Impacts on Equity and Efficiency (March 26, 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=610299

Klaus Deininger (Contact Author)

World Bank - Development Economics Group (DEC) ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/kdeininger

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

1818 H. Street, N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States

Raffaella Castagnini

World Bank ( email )

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

María A. González

World Bank

1818 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20433
United States

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