Primaries and the New Hampshire Effect

43 Pages Posted: 1 Nov 2004

See all articles by Tilman Klumpp

Tilman Klumpp

University of Alberta, Department of Economics

Mattias Polborn

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Abstract

Candidates for U.S. presidential elections are determined through sequential elections in single states, the primaries. We develop a model in which candidates can influence their winning probability in electoral districts by spending money on campaigning. The equilibrium replicates several stylized facts very well: Campaigning is very intensive in the first district. The outcome of the first election then creates an asymmetry in the candidates' incentives to campaign in the next district, which endogenously increases the equilibrium probability that the first winner wins in further districts. On the normative side, our model offers a possible explanation for the sequential organization: It leads (in expectation) to a lower level of advertising expenditures than simultaneous elections. Moreover, if one of the candidates is the more effective campaigner, sequential elections also perform better with regard to the selection of the best candidate.

Keywords: Elections, primaries, political campaigns

JEL Classification: C7, D7

Suggested Citation

Klumpp, Tilman and Polborn, Mattias K., Primaries and the New Hampshire Effect. Journal of Public Economics, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=611041 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.611041

Tilman Klumpp

University of Alberta, Department of Economics ( email )

Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2R3
Canada

Mattias K. Polborn (Contact Author)

Vanderbilt University - College of Arts and Science - Department of Economics ( email )

Box 1819 Station B
Nashville, TN 37235
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany