Information Disclosure in Speculative Markets

20 Pages Posted: 4 Nov 2004

Date Written: June 2006

Abstract

When investors hold different opinions about the value of an asset, prices can diverge from fundamental values and incorporate a speculative component. This paper analyzes the effect of such a speculative environment on managerial incentives to voluntarily disclose information about the value of the firm. I show that differences of opinion, when they induce a speculative premium, increase the threshold for information disclosure thereby reducing the likelihood that voluntary disclosure of information occurs. The model generates testable empirical implications about the propensity to issue management earnings forecasts.

Keywords: Voluntary disclosure, difference of opinions, speculative premium

JEL Classification: D49, D84, G12, G30, M40

Suggested Citation

Dorobantu, Florin A., Information Disclosure in Speculative Markets (June 2006). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=613143 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.613143

Florin A. Dorobantu (Contact Author)

The Brattle Group ( email )

44 Brattle Street
3rd Floor
Cambridge, MA 02138-3736
United States

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