The Role of Government in Corporate Governance

28 Pages Posted: 2 Nov 2004 Last revised: 29 Mar 2010

See all articles by Cary Coglianese

Cary Coglianese

University of Pennsylvania Law School

Thomas J. Healey

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Elizabeth K. Keating

Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government

Michael L. Michael

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS)

Abstract

Numerous corporate scandals in the past several years have fueled widespread debate over proposals for government action. The central challenge for government is how to restore corporate integrity and market confidence without overreacting and stifling the dynamism that underlies a strong economy. To examine this challenge, the Center for Business and Government's Regulatory Policy Program organized a conference in May 2004 on The Role of Government in Corporate Governance. The conference brought together government officials, business leaders, and academic researchers to discuss three fundamental public policy issues raised by recent corporate abuses. First, who should regulate corporate management - government agencies or self-regulatory organizations? Second, how should regulatory commands be designed, either as detailed rules or broad principles? Finally, how should regulations be enforced? This report synthesizes the conference dialogue organized around these three questions and explores conditions under which different configurations of regulatory institutions, standards, and enforcement practices can further both corporate integrity and productivity.

Keywords: corporate governance, financial regulation, self-regulation, regulatory enforcement

JEL Classification: G34, G38, K22, M49

Suggested Citation

Coglianese, Cary and Healey, Thomas J. and Keating, Elizabeth K. and Michael, Michael L., The Role of Government in Corporate Governance. New York University Journal of Law and Business, Vol. 1, p. 219, 2004; KSG Working Paper No. RWP04-045. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=613421 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.613421

Cary Coglianese (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-6867 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.upenn.edu/coglianese

Thomas J. Healey

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Elizabeth K. Keating

Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-9856 (Phone)
617-495-8963 (Fax)

Michael L. Michael

Harvard University - Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) ( email )

79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-5402 (Phone)
617-496-0063 (Fax)

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