Policy Convergence Under Approval and Plurality Voting: the Role of Policy Commitment

15 Pages Posted: 18 Feb 2007

See all articles by Arnaud Dellis

Arnaud Dellis

Universite du Quebec a Montreal

Mandar P. OAK

Williams College - Department of Economics


Proponents of Approval Voting argue that this electoral rule leads to more centrist outcomes compared to Plurality Voting. This claim has been substantiated by scholarly work using spatial models of political competition. We revisit this issue in the context of a model of political competition in which 1) candidates are policy-motivated; 2) candidacy decisions are endogenous; and 3) candidates can credibly commit to implementing any policy. Under these assumptions we find the opposite to be true - Plurality Voting yields convergence to the median voter's ideal policy but Approval Voting may not. We argue that this result is driven by the differential incentives for candidate entry under the two voting rules. Our results suggest that whether Approval Voting yields more centrist outcomes vis-รก-vis Plurality Voting depends on the possibility of policy commitment on the part of the candidates.

Keywords: Policy Commitment, Policy Convergence, Voting Rules, Approval Voting

JEL Classification: D72, D78

Suggested Citation

Dellis, Arnaud and Oak, Mandar P., Policy Convergence Under Approval and Plurality Voting: the Role of Policy Commitment. Social Choice and Welfare, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=614003

Arnaud Dellis (Contact Author)

Universite du Quebec a Montreal ( email )

315 St. Catherine Street East
Montreal, Quebec H2X 3X2

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/site/arnauddellis/

Mandar P. Oak

Williams College - Department of Economics ( email )

Fernald House
Williamstown, MA 01267
United States
413-597-2300 (Phone)
413-597-4045 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.williams.edu/Economics/oak/cv.htm

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