The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Role of Retaliation in Filings

28 Pages Posted: 8 Nov 2004

See all articles by Robert M. Feinberg

Robert M. Feinberg

American University - Department of Economics

Kara M. Reynolds

American University - Department of Economics

Date Written: November 2004

Abstract

Over the past decade, the world-wide use of antidumping has become very widespread - 41 WTO-member countries initiated antidumping cases over the 1995-2003 period. From another perspective, US exporters were subjected to 139 antidumping cases during this period, by enforcement agencies representing 20 countries. In this context, it is natural to consider whether antidumping filings may be motivated as retaliation against similar measures imposed on a country's exporters. This is the focus of our study, though we also control for the bilateral export flows involved and non-retaliatory impacts of past cases, with other motivations - macroeconomic, industry-specific and political considerations - dealt with through industry, country and year fixed effects. Applying probit analysis to a WTO database on reported filings, we find strong evidence that retaliation was a significant motive in explaining the rise of antidumping filings over the past decade, though interesting differences emerge in the reactions to traditional and new users of antidumping.

Keywords: Antidumping, retaliation

JEL Classification: F13

Suggested Citation

Feinberg, Robert M. and Reynolds, Kara M., The Spread of Antidumping Regimes and the Role of Retaliation in Filings (November 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=614864 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.614864

Robert M. Feinberg

American University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20016-8029
United States
202-885-3770 (Phone)
202-885-3790 (Fax)

Kara M. Reynolds (Contact Author)

American University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20016-8029
United States
202-885-3768 (Phone)
202-885-3790 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
124
Abstract Views
2,031
rank
309,396
PlumX Metrics