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A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects

CentER Discussion Paper No. 2004-88

8 Pages Posted: 10 Nov 2004

See all articles by Herbert Hamers

Herbert Hamers

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Flip Klijn

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics and Economic History

Marco Slikker

Eindhoven University of Technology (TUE) - School of Industrial Engineering

Bas van Velzen

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: September 2004

Abstract

We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining stable outcomes.

Keywords: Game theory, cooperative games, allocation

JEL Classification: C71, D61, D70

Suggested Citation

Hamers, Herbert and Klijn, Flip and Slikker, Marco and Velzen, Bas van, A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects (September 2004). CentER Discussion Paper No. 2004-88, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=616606 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.616606

Herbert Hamers (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 4666 2660 (Phone)

Tilburg University - Department of Econometrics & Operations Research

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Flip Klijn

Autonomous University of Barcelona - Department of Economics and Economic History ( email )

Edifici B - Campus Bellaterra
Barcelona, 08193
Spain

Marco Slikker

Eindhoven University of Technology (TUE) - School of Industrial Engineering ( email )

P.O. Box 513
5600 MB Eindhoven
Netherlands

Bas van Velzen

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

No Address Available

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