Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives of Federal Prosecutors

Posted: 11 Nov 2004  

Cheryl X. Long

Colgate University - Economics Department

Richard T. Boylan

Rice University - Department of Economics

Abstract

We examine the relation between local labor markets and the behavior of federal prosecutors. Empirical evidence is provided that assistant U.S. attorneys in districts with high private salaries are more likely to take a case to trial, compared to assistants in districts with low private salaries. We explain this finding as follows. In high salary districts, government salaries are not competitive relative to the private sector. As a result, positions of federal prosecutors are sought by individuals who want the trial experience needed to secure desired private sector employment. The following additional evidence is provided to further support this explanation. First, the turnover of assistant U.S. attorneys is higher in high-private-salary districts than in low-private-salary districts. Second, individuals who leave their employment as assistant U.S. attorneys are of higher quality in districts with higher private lawyer salaries. Third, assistant U.S. attorneys with more trial experience are more likely to take positions in large private law firms.

Suggested Citation

Long, Cheryl X. and Boylan, Richard T., Salaries, Plea Rates, and the Career Objectives of Federal Prosecutors. Journal of Law and Economics, October 2005. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=616702

Cheryl X. Long (Contact Author)

Colgate University - Economics Department ( email )

13 Oak Drive
Hamilton, NY 13346
United States

Richard T. Boylan

Rice University - Department of Economics ( email )

6100 South Main Street
Houston, TX 77005
United States

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