The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Versus the Simultaneous Ascending Auction: An Experimental Approach

A1.133 WP 188

21 Pages Posted: 24 Feb 1998

See all articles by Donald R. Brenner

Donald R. Brenner

American University - Kogod School of Business

John Morgan

University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group

Date Written: 1997

Abstract

In private values settings, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism leads to efficient auction outcomes, while the theoretical properties of the Simultaneous Ascending (SA) auction are not well understook. This leads us to compare the properties of an SA and a VCG auction in an experimental setting with multiple objects having complementarities.

JEL Classification: D44; L50

Suggested Citation

Brenner, Donald R. and Morgan, John, The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Versus the Simultaneous Ascending Auction: An Experimental Approach (1997). A1.133 WP 188, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=61728 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.61728

Donald R. Brenner

American University - Kogod School of Business

4400 Massachusetts Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20816-8044
United States
202-885-1925 (Phone)

John Morgan (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group ( email )

Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-2669 (Phone)
810-885-5959 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/rjmorgan/

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