Batch Queues with Choice of Arrivals: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Study

45 Pages Posted: 22 Nov 2004

See all articles by William E. Stein

William E. Stein

Texas A&M University - Mays Business School

Amnon Rapoport

University of Arizona - Eller College of Management

Darryl A. Seale

University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Hongtao Zhang

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - Department of Information & Systems Management

Rami Zwick

University of California, Riverside

Date Written: September 24, 2004

Abstract

We study both theoretically and experimentally the decisions players make in two queueing games with batch service. In both games, players are asked to independently decide when to join a discrete-time queue to receive service, or they may simply choose not to join it at all. Equilibrium solutions in pure and mixed strategies are constructed for two games where balking is prohibited and where it is allowed. They are then tested experimentally in a study that varies the game type (balking vs. no balking) and information structure (private vs. public information) in a 2X2 between-subject design. With repeated iterations of the stage game, all four experimental conditions result in aggregate, but not individual, behavior approaching mixed-strategy equilibrium play.

Keywords: Batch queueing, equilibrium solution, experimental economics

JEL Classification: C90, Z13

Suggested Citation

Stein, William E. and Rapoport, Amnon and Seale, Darryl A. and Zhang, Hongtao and Zwick, Rami, Batch Queues with Choice of Arrivals: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Study (September 24, 2004). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=617741 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.617741

William E. Stein

Texas A&M University - Mays Business School ( email )

INFO Dept.
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Amnon Rapoport (Contact Author)

University of Arizona - Eller College of Management ( email )

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Darryl A. Seale

University of Nevada, Las Vegas ( email )

4505 S. Maryland Parkway
Las Vegas, NV 89154
United States

Hongtao Zhang

Hong Kong University of Science & Technology (HKUST) - Department of Information & Systems Management ( email )

Clear Water Bay, Kowloon
Hong Kong

Rami Zwick

University of California, Riverside ( email )

900 University Avenue
Riverside, CA 92521
United States

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