Incentives and Anonymity Principle: Crowding Out Toward Users

28 Pages Posted: 13 Nov 2004

See all articles by Patricia Crifo

Patricia Crifo

Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie; Université Paris X Nanterre - Department of Economics; Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO)

Jean-Louis Rulliere

University of Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Institute of Finance and Insurance Science (ISFA)

Date Written: October 2004

Abstract

In our model, an agent produces an outcome by a costly effort and then distributes it among heterogeneous users. The agent's payoff is the weighted sum of the users' shares and the coefficient reflecting their heterogeneity. When the agent neglects users' heterogeneity the game leads to an anonymous allocation. Otherwise, the equilibrium distribution is non-egalitarian but more efficient. Low performing agents reduce inequality among users by delivering an egalitarian service, while intermediate or high performing agents tend to prefer (but not always) delivering an unequal service, thereby breaking the anonymity principle. Incentives do matter regarding the crowding effect toward users.

Keywords: incentives, anonymity principle, egalitarian tasks allocation, principal agent user relationship, crowding-out effect

JEL Classification: C9, J33, J45, L32, M5

Suggested Citation

Crifo, Patricia and Rulliere, Jean-Louis, Incentives and Anonymity Principle: Crowding Out Toward Users (October 2004). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1316. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=619022

Patricia Crifo

Ecole Polytechnique, Paris - Laboratoire d'Econometrie ( email )

Route de Saclay
Palaiseau, 91128
France

Université Paris X Nanterre - Department of Economics

Nanterre Cedex, 92001
France

Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organization (CIRANO)

2020 rue University, 25th floor
Montreal H3C 3J7, Quebec
Canada

Jean-Louis Rulliere (Contact Author)

University of Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Institute of Finance and Insurance Science (ISFA) ( email )

50, Avenue Tony Garnier
Lyon Cedex 07, 69366
France
+33 670 43 60 87 (Phone)

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