A Model of Academic Journal Quality with Applications to Open-Access Journals
NET Institute Working Paper No. 04-18
25 Pages Posted: 18 Nov 2004
Date Written: November 2004
Abstract
Previous research modeled academic journals as platforms connecting authors with readers in a two-sided market. This research used the same basic framework also used to study telephony, credit cards, video game consoles, etc. In this paper, we focus on a key difference between the market for academic journals and these other markets: journals vary in terms of quality, where a journal's quality determined by the quality of the papers it publishes. We provide a simple model of journal quality. As an illustration of the value of the model, we use it to address issues that have arisen in the recent debate concerning whether, in the Internet age, journals should become open access (freely available to readers, financed by author rather than subscriber fees). Among other issues, we examine (a) whether open-access journals would tend to publish more articles than traditional journals, moving further down the quality spectrum in order to boost revenue; (b) whether journal quality affects the profitability of adopting open access; and (c) whether submission fees or acceptance fees are better instruments to extract surplus from authors.
Keywords: Open access, academic journal, two-sided market, quality
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?
Recommended Papers
-
Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration
-
Open Access as a Crude Solution to a Hold-up Problem in the Two-Sided Market for Academic Journals
-
The Pricing of Academic Journals: A Two-Sided Market Perspective
By Doh-shin Jeon and Jean-charles Rochet
-
Bundling Electronic Journals and Competition Among Publishers
By Doh-shin Jeon and Domenico Menicucci
-
Academic Journal Prices in a Digital Age: A Two-Sided-Market Model
-
Getting Cited: Does Open Access Help?
By Patrick Gaule and Nicolas Maystre
-
Pricing of Scientific Journal and Market Power
By Mathias Dewatripont, Victor A. Ginsburgh, ...
-
By Mark J. Mccabe, Christopher M. Snyder, ...
-
Inefficient Intra-Firm Incentives Can Stabilize Cartels in Cournot Oligopolies
By Roland Kirstein and Annette Kirstein