Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient

15 Pages Posted: 13 Nov 2004

See all articles by Drew Fudenberg

Drew Fudenberg

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)

David K. Levine

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS)

Satoru Takahashi

Harvard University - Department of Economics

Date Written: November 2004

Abstract

The limit set of perfect public equilibrium payoffs of a repeated game as the discount factor goes to one is characterized, with examples, even when the full-dimensionality condition fails.

Keywords: Economic Theory, Game Theory, Repeated Games, Perfect Public Equilibrium, Folk Theorem

JEL Classification: X15, X16

Suggested Citation

Fudenberg, Drew and Levine, David K. and Takahashi, Satoru, Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient (November 2004). Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2051. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=619283 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.619283

Drew Fudenberg (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
50 Memorial Drive
Cambridge, MA 02139-4307
United States

David K. Levine

Washington University in St. Louis - Department of Economics ( email )

One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.dklevine.com

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

Villa La Fonte, via delle Fontanelle 18
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

Satoru Takahashi

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
94
Abstract Views
1,019
rank
272,639
PlumX Metrics