Sequential Bidding in Auctions of Construction Contracts

Posted: 17 Nov 2004

See all articles by Dakshina G. De Silva

Dakshina G. De Silva

Department of Economics, Lancaster University Management School

Timothy Dunne

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland

Georgia Kosmopoulou

University of Oklahoma - Department of Economics

Abstract

We analyze bidding patterns in morning and afternoon auctions of construction contracts. We find no statistically significant difference in the probability to bid in the afternoon between those who won and those who lost in morning sessions. As a result, the information released in the morning increases the observable asymmetries and affects bidding behavior. Firms that win in the morning bid more aggressively, in the absolute sense, in the afternoon. However, those who lost in morning sessions bid more aggressively, relative to their morning bids, than those who won in the morning.

Keywords: Asymmetric auctions

JEL Classification: D44

Suggested Citation

De Silva, Dakshina G. and Dunne, Timothy and Kosmopoulou, Georgia, Sequential Bidding in Auctions of Construction Contracts. Economics Letters, Vol. 76, pp. 239-44, July 2002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=619782

Dakshina G. De Silva

Department of Economics, Lancaster University Management School ( email )

Lancaster LA1 4YX
United Kingdom

Timothy Dunne

Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland ( email )

PO Box 6387
Cleveland, OH 44101-1387
United States

Georgia Kosmopoulou (Contact Author)

University of Oklahoma - Department of Economics ( email )

633 Elm Avenue
306 Ellison Hall
Norman, OK 73019
United States
405-325-3083 (Phone)
405-325-5842 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://georgiakosmopoulou.oucreate.com/

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