The Unsolvable Dilemma of a Paretian Policymaker

12 Pages Posted: 18 Nov 2004

See all articles by Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

Giuseppe Dari‐Mattiacci

Amsterdam Law School; Amsterdam Business School; Tinbergen Institute

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Abstract

In this paper, we argue that social decisionmaking is subject to a fundamental conflict between consistency and completeness. We show that a consistent welfarist method of policy assessment, that is, one that never violates the Pareto principle, may be incomplete in the sense of being incapable of providing a solution to important social welfare problems.

Keywords: Individualistic social welfare, Interdependent preferences

JEL Classification: C0, D63, K0

Suggested Citation

Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe and Garoupa, Nuno, The Unsolvable Dilemma of a Paretian Policymaker. Supreme Court Economic Review, Forthcoming; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-52. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=621862 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.621862

Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci (Contact Author)

Amsterdam Law School ( email )

Nieuwe Achtergract 166
Amsterdam, 1018 WV
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://uva.nl/profile/g.darimattiacci

Amsterdam Business School ( email )

Plantage Muidergracht 12
Amsterdam, 1018TV
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://uva.nl/profile/g.darimattiacci

Tinbergen Institute ( email )

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

HOME PAGE: http://uva.nl/profile/g.darimattiacci

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
183
rank
161,652
Abstract Views
2,718
PlumX Metrics
!

Under construction: SSRN citations while be offline until July when we will launch a brand new and improved citations service, check here for more details.

For more information