12 Pages Posted: 18 Nov 2004
In this paper, we argue that social decisionmaking is subject to a fundamental conflict between consistency and completeness. We show that a consistent welfarist method of policy assessment, that is, one that never violates the Pareto principle, may be incomplete in the sense of being incapable of providing a solution to important social welfare problems.
Keywords: Individualistic social welfare, Interdependent preferences
JEL Classification: C0, D63, K0
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Dari‐Mattiacci, Giuseppe and Garoupa, Nuno M., The Unsolvable Dilemma of a Paretian Policymaker. Supreme Court Economic Review, Forthcoming; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 04-52. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=621862 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.621862